
Sandworm APT Group Targeting Poland’s Power Grid with DynoWiper Malware
The digital battlefield continues to expand, and nowhere is this more evident than in the persistent targeting of critical infrastructure. Late December 2025 brought unsettling news from Poland, where its energy grid became the epicenter of what security experts are labeling the country’s most significant cyberattack in years. At the heart of this coordinated assault was the notorious Russian-aligned Sandworm APT group, deploying a destructive new variant of malware: DynoWiper.
Sandworm’s Destructive Legacy Unveiled in Poland
The Sandworm APT group, formally linked to Unit 74455 of the Russian GRU, has a well-documented history of orchestrating some of the most damaging cyberattacks on critical infrastructure globally. Their past campaigns include the 2015 and 2016 BlackEnergy attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, the NotPetya wiper in 2017, and the Industroyer attacks targeting industrial control systems. This latest incident against Poland’s energy sector underscores their relentless evolution and capability to inflict significant operational disruption.
The attack on Poland, described by experts as particularly sophisticated, targeted multiple points within the energy infrastructure. While specific technical details are still emerging, the coordinated nature and the choice of a destructive payload point to a strategic, nation-state-sponsored operation aimed at destabilization. The group’s modus operandi consistently involves meticulous reconnaissance, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and the deployment of tailored malware designed for maximum impact.
DynoWiper: A New Threat in Sandworm’s Arsenal
At the core of the Polish cyberattack was DynoWiper, a newly identified malware variant. While details surrounding its full capabilities are still under deep analysis by cybersecurity researchers, its designation as a “wiper” immediately signals its destructive intent. Wiper malware is designed to erase or corrupt data on target systems, rendering them inoperable. This goes beyond simple data theft, aiming instead for system degradation and operational paralysis.
Previous Sandworm wiper campaigns, such as NotPetya, demonstrated their capability to cause widespread, indiscriminate damage beyond the initial target. The deployment of DynoWiper suggests Sandworm is refining its destructive tools, potentially incorporating new evasion techniques, improved persistence mechanisms, or more sophisticated data destruction methods that could prove challenging for traditional endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions. The specific impact of DynoWiper on Poland’s power grid is still being assessed, but typical wiper attacks can lead to system re-imaging, data loss, and prolonged outage times.
Implications for Critical Infrastructure Security
The Sandworm attack on Poland’s energy grid serves as a stark reminder of the persistent and evolving threats facing critical infrastructure globally. These sectors, including energy, water, transportation, and healthcare, are prime targets for APT groups due to their fundamental role in national security and economic stability. The successful infiltration and deployment of destructive malware highlight several critical vulnerabilities:
- Supply Chain Weaknesses: APT groups often exploit weaknesses in the supply chain of critical infrastructure providers, gaining initial access through trusted third-party vendors.
- Operational Technology (OT) Vulnerabilities: Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA systems, often running legacy software and lacking robust security controls, present significant attack surfaces.
- Sophisticated Social Engineering: Human factors remain a primary entry point, with spear-phishing and other social engineering tactics used to gain initial foothold.
- Zero-Day Exploits: While not yet confirmed for DynoWiper, Sandworm has a history of leveraging undisclosed vulnerabilities for initial access or privilege escalation.
Remediation Actions and Proactive Defense
In the face of advanced threats like Sandworm and destructive malware like DynoWiper, robust and proactive cybersecurity measures are paramount, especially for critical infrastructure operators. While specific CVEs related to DynoWiper’s initial access vectors are not yet public, best practices remain crucial:
- Robust Network Segmentation: Implement strong network segmentation, particularly between IT and OT networks, to limit lateral movement and contain breaches.
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enforce MFA across all critical systems and remote access points to significantly reduce the risk of credential compromise.
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) / Extended Detection and Response (XDR): Deploy advanced EDR/XDR solutions with behavioral analysis capabilities to detect anomalous activity indicative of wiper deployment.
- Regular Backups and Disaster Recovery: Maintain isolated, air-gapped backups of all critical data and systems. Develop and regularly test comprehensive disaster recovery plans to minimize downtime from destructive attacks.
- Patch Management: Implement a rigorous patch management program, prioritizing critical vulnerabilities, especially those affecting internet-facing systems and OT environments.
- Security Awareness Training: Continuously educate employees on social engineering tactics and phishing awareness.
- Threat Intelligence Sharing: Actively participate in threat intelligence sharing communities to stay informed about emerging threats and attacker TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures).
- Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing specifically tailored for OT environments to identify and remediate weaknesses.
The Ongoing Battle for Digital Sovereignty
The targeting of Poland’s power grid by the Sandworm APT group and the deployment of DynoWiper underscore the escalating cyber warfare landscape. Nations and critical infrastructure operators must remain vigilant, continually adapting their defenses to counter sophisticated and state-sponsored threats. This incident serves as a critical call to action for enhanced cybersecurity investments, international collaboration, and the development of resilient cyber defenses to protect the foundational services our societies rely upon.
The dynamic nature of these threats demands a proactive and adaptive approach, shifting from mere incident response to robust cyber resilience. Understanding the adversary’s capabilities, hardening infrastructure, and fostering a culture of security are no longer optional but essential for safeguarding national security and economic stability in an interconnected world.


