The cybersecurity landscape is in a constant state of flux, with threat actors continuously refining their tactics to breach defenses. A concerning development has emerged, showcasing adversaries’ increasing sophistication: the co-option of legitimate digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) tools for malicious purposes. Specifically, the open-source incident response tool Velociraptor is now being observed as an enabler for covert remote access, marking an evolution from the long-standing abuse of remote monitoring and management (RMM) utilities.

The Evolution of Threat Actor Tactics: Beyond RMM

For years, threat actors have exploited vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software to gain and maintain persistence within compromised networks. Tools like ConnectWise Control, TeamViewer, and AnyDesk, designed for legitimate IT administration, became common vectors for illicit remote access. This approach allowed attackers to blend their activities with legitimate network traffic, minimizing their footprint and evading detection.

However, the cybersecurity community has largely adapted to this tactic, implementing enhanced monitoring for RMM tool usage and developing specific signatures for their misuse. In response, threat actors are now shifting their focus. The recent sophisticated intrusions highlight a new frontier: the repurposing of highly specialized DFIR frameworks, such as Velociraptor, to minimize the deployment of custom malware and evade security controls.

Velociraptor: A Legitimate Tool Repurposed Maliciously

Velociraptor is a powerful, open-source endpoint visibility and analysis tool designed by security professionals for security professionals. It enables rapid incident response, forensics investigations, and security monitoring by collecting artifacts from endpoints at scale. Its legitimate uses include:

• Collecting forensic artifacts (e.g., memory dumps, file system records, registry hives).
• Performing live system analysis.
• Identifying indicators of compromise (IoCs).
• Automating incident response playbooks.

The very features that make Velociraptor invaluable for defenders also make it attractive to attackers. Its ability to execute commands, collect data, and establish communication channels, all while operating within a legitimate framework, allows threat actors to:

• Minimize custom malware deployment: By leveraging Velociraptor’s built-in capabilities, attackers reduce their reliance on custom-developed malware, which is often easier for security tools to detect.
• Evade detection: Since Velociraptor is a legitimate and often whitelisted tool in many organizations, its network traffic and on-host activity can appear benign, making it harder for traditional security solutions to flag it as malicious.
• Establish covert remote access: Threat actors can configure Velociraptor to act as a persistent backdoor, enabling remote command execution, data exfiltration, and lateral movement within the compromised environment.

The Modus Operandi: How Attackers Abuse Velociraptor

While specific attack chains can vary, the general modus operandi involves threat actors first gaining initial access to a network (e.g., via phishing, exploiting a vulnerability). Once inside, instead of deploying typical backdoors, they install and configure Velociraptor. They then may:

• Deploy a legitimate Velociraptor client: The client is deployed on target endpoints, often disguised or installed alongside other legitimate software.
• Connect to a malicious Velociraptor server: Instead of connecting to the organization’s legitimate Velociraptor server, the compromised clients are directed to an attacker-controlled server. This server then acts as the command and control (C2) infrastructure.
• Execute commands and extract data: Through the malicious Velociraptor server, attackers can leverage the tool’s powerful query language (VQL) to execute arbitrary commands, collect sensitive data, and exfiltrate it covertly. This bypasses many traditional endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions that might be specifically looking for known malicious executables.

Remediation Actions and Mitigations

Detecting and mitigating the abuse of legitimate DFIR tools requires a multi-layered approach focusing on enhanced visibility, behavioral analysis, and strict access controls.

• Implement Robust Endpoint Monitoring: Monitor for the unauthorized installation or execution of legitimate DFIR tools like Velociraptor. Look for instances where the tool is communicating with external, untrusted IP addresses or domains.
• Network Segmentation and Egress Filtering: Segment your network to limit lateral movement. Implement strict egress filtering to prevent internal systems from communicating with untrusted external Velociraptor servers or atypical C2 infrastructure.
• Behavioral Analytics: Leverage EDR and XDR solutions to detect anomalous behavior patterns associated with Velociraptor. This includes unusual command execution patterns, data stage-outs, or communication with suspicious endpoints, even if the Velociraptor binary itself is legitimate.
• Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure that users and systems only have the minimum necessary privileges to perform their functions. This limits attackers’ ability to install and configure tools like Velociraptor.
• Software Whitelisting/Application Control: Implement robust application whitelisting policies that only allow execution of approved software. While challenging for dynamic environments, this can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized tool deployment.
• Regular Audits of DFIR Tool Deployment: If your organization legitimately uses Velociraptor, conduct regular audits of its deployment, configuration, and communication channels to ensure it’s not being co-opted. Verify that all Velociraptor clients are connecting to your authorized, internal server.
• Threat Intelligence Integration: Stay updated on the latest threat actor tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Integrate relevant threat intelligence feeds into your security information and event management (SIEM) and EDR platforms.

Conclusion

The abuse of powerful, legitimate incident response tools like Velociraptor marks a significant shift in threat actor methodology. This evolution demands that organizations move beyond signature-based detection towards a more proactive, behavioral, and intelligence-driven security posture. By understanding these new tactics and implementing robust mitigation strategies, security teams can better protect their environments from sophisticated adversaries who blend in by using the very tools designed to catch them.